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I. INTRODUCTION.
In examining the Plaintiffs' often convoluted arguments, Defendants would urge the
Court to keep in mind the basics of this case. Despite the clear Policy language basing UM
payments on the amount that the insured would be legally entitled to recover from the uninsured
motorist, Plaintiffs maintain that UM coverage is to be treated similar to medical payments
("MedPay") or health insurance, where fault for the injury is irrelevant and only a minimal
causation analysis is warranted-essentially, Plaintiffs' position requires an insurer to take its
insured's word that a particular bill is related to an automobile collision. Plaintiffs fault
Defendants for waiting to investigate and evaluate the claim, or even waiting to at least examine
Sarah's medical records, before payment.
The basic facts are as follows: Sarah Weinstein was injured on September 30,2002. After
very conservative treatment, she returned to playing soccer in early 2003, and then, apparently,
suffered an aggravation of her injuries. Most of her treatment, including a surgery, did not occur
until the period of March through May of 2003. Although there were admittedly some mistakes
made as to paying bills under the MedPay coverage (which the jury found to not have been done
in bad faith), most of the MedPay coverage was paid out at the end of July 2003, with the last
payment being made in August 2003. At the beginning of September 2003, the UM adjuster
became involved, asked for a new medical records release (in order to comply with new
requirements from the federal government concerning HIPAA) and a list of medical providers.
Plaintiffs waited until near the end of September before providing the list. Then, barely a week
later, Plaintiffs' counsel (Mr. Bistline) made his appearance and revoked any prior medical
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records releases. In November 2003, Plaintiffs' attorney promised to provide the medical
records, but did not provide any until April of 2004 (he forgot some), and finally sent the
remainder near the end of May 2004. In early June 2004, Defendants responded by offering an
advance payment of $10,000, which Plaintiffs responded to in early July 2004 by filing suit.
Plaintiffs fault Defendants for basically four (4) things: (i) requesting multiple medical
records releases, (ii) not getting records from the MedPay file, (iii) delaying payment, and (iv)
the offering of the Pay-in-Advance Agreement. The multiple release requests were unfortunate,
but necessary. The first request was for the use of the UM adjuster. It only authorized the release
of records from three (3) medical providers and a single pharmacy. It was not returned to the
adjuster until after December 5, 2002, and rendered void by the new HIPAA regulations in the
spring of 2003. See R. 392-405, Exhibit 10044. See also Appellants' Brief;p. 7 n. 6 (discussing
HIPAA); Tr. (9121107) p. 846, L1. 17-21. The second request was for the use of the MedPay
adjuster and was later rendered void by the then newly promulgated federal HIPAA regulations.
The third request was from the UM adjuster so she would have one that comported by the new
HIPAA regulations, and was combined with a request for a list of medical providers. Tr.
(9121107) p. 845, L1. 1 - 17. Thus, when viewed in context of the chronology of the claim, there
was nothing unreasonable about any of the requests.
The delay in obtaining the file from the MedPay adjuster will probably never be known
since the MedPay adjuster had left the company and was unavailable for deposition or testimony
at trial. However, what is relevant is that when the MedPay file was finally examined, it
contained very little in the way of medical records, and those only pertained to bills that had

-
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already been paid out by the MedPay adjuster. Thus, it would not have assisted the UM adjuster.

See Tr. (9121107) p. 866, L1. 11-21.
Plaintiffs' delay in payment argument is the most perplexing because Plaintiffs have
never articulated when payment should have been made, and even a cursory examination shows
that the most significant delays were due to the Plaintiffs. Specifically, when Mrs. Weinstein
called the adjuster on September 2, 2003, she claimed extreme financial distress. However, Mrs.
Weinstein did not send a list of Sarah's medical providers until September 25, 2003. See

Appellants ' Brief; pp. 6-7. As noted, Plaintiffs' counsel (Mr. Bistline) notified Defendants of his
representation in early October. Despite calls and letters from the adjuster on October 10, 13, and

15, 2003, Mr. Bistline did not respond until October 28, 2003. On November 3, 2003, Mr.
Bistline promised to send certain records to Defendants (he had revoked the earlier records
release), but did not send any until April 20, 2004, and did not send all the records he had
promised until a letter dated May 20, 2004. See Id., pp. 7-10. In other words, Plaintiffs or their
attorney were responsible for delaying the ordering and review of necessary medical records
from September 2,2003 to after May 20,2004.
Plaintiffs also fault Defendants for the Pay-in-Advance (PIA) Agreement. However, as
discussed more fully below, the PIA Agreement was intended to make clear that neither party
was waiving its rights because of the tender of $10,000 in advance of a final settlement.
It is also clear that Plaintiffs have not always acted in good faith. On several occasions
Plaintiffs demanded immediate action from Defendants, but then failed to timely forward
necessary information, including the approximately six (6) month delay in forwarding medical
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records. Plaintiffs prohibited Defendants from independently collecting records. Many of
Plaintiffs actions and representations, in hindsight, appear duplicitous, such as informing
Defendants shortly after the accident that they were represented by counsel when they apparently
were unrepresented; by submitting medical bills for payment by Defendants that were unrelated
to the subject injury; by telling Defendants that they were in dire financial straights when they
had inherited hundreds of thousands of dollars; by submitting a settlemenddemand letter that
grossly overstated both the total medical bills and the amount of unpaid medical bills; by
accusing Defendants of attempting to mislead them into not filing suit against the uninsured
tortfeasor, but nevertheless failing to file suit against the uninsured driver.
In short, Plaintiffs case is based on nothing more than emotional hyperbole. The District
Court erred by not granting summary judgment, a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding
the verdict in favor of Defendants, andlor a new trial.

11. ARGUMENT
A.

PLAINTIFFS HAVE MISSTATED AND DISTORTED THE FACTS.
Plaintiffs have seriously misstated and distorted the facts in their "Nature of the Case,"

"Statement of Facts" and the body of their brief. Defendants reassert the facts of this case as set
forth in their opening briefing and in this Reply Brief.

B.

THERE WAS NO BREACH OF CONTRACT OR BAD FAITH.
As noted in Defendants' opening brief, Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim is premised on

the assertion that a UM carrier must pay each medical bill as it is submitted (i.e., similar to
submission of claims under a health insurance policy). Plaintiffs not only admit that this is their

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 4

argument, but take it a step further by asserting that the failure to do so is automatically bad faith.
See Respondents' Brief, p. 10. See also Tr. (9121107) p. 858, L1. 14-23 (adjuster's testimony that
Plaintiffs' counsel had requested payment of bills under UM coverage prior to an evaluation of
the claim).
1.

Plaintiffs' Theorv is a Matter of First Im~ression.

"[Wlhen a claim involves a legal question of first impression, an insurer does not commit
bad faith by litigating the claim even if the insurer does not prevail." Vaught v. Dairyland Ins.
Co., 131 Idaho 357, 362, 956 P.2d 674, 679 (1998). Plaintiffs attempt to deal with the issue of
first impression by first setting up a "straw man" by misstating Defendants' arguments, to-wit:
"Appellants' contend bad faith in the UM context is an 'issue of first impression' in Idaho."
Respondents' Brief, p. 10. Then, to knock down their "straw man," Plaintiffs direct the Court's
attention to Anderson v. Farmers Inc. Co. of Idaho, 130 Idaho 755, 947 P.2d 1003 (1997) and
American Foreign Ins. Co. v. Reichert, 140 Idaho 394, 94 P.3d 699 (2004), and note that these
cases apply bad faith to a UM claim, QED. See Respondents' Brief; pp. 11-12. Unfortunately for
Plaintiffs, Defendants have never argued that application of bad faith standards to UM policies is
a matter of first impression. Defendants' actual argument is that it is a matter of first impression
in Idaho whether a UM carrier is required to make a stream of payments as bills are submitted
rather than to first gather or receive the medical records in order to make their investigation and
analysis; and because it is a matter of first impression, Defendants should have been granted
summary judgment, judgment as a matter of law, or judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

-
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The cases cited by Plaintiffs are likewise unavailing. While Anderson considered a badfaith claim against the UM insurer, it did not address the issue of when and how payments under
a UM policy should be paid. Rather, this Court held that there was no bad faith because "Farmers
consistently maintained that the remaining medical bills [apparently some initial bills were paid
out under a MedPay type coverage] and general damages were in dispute." Anderson, 130 Idaho
at 759. Similarly, although Reichert addressed a bad faith claim brought against a UM insurer, it
did not address the issue of multiple-piecemeal payments versus a single payment. Nevertheless,
it is significant to note in the facts that: "Years after the accident and before Reichert completed
the worker's compensation proceedings, Reichert and American agreed to arbitrate the uninsured
motorist claim." Reichert, 140 Idaho at 397 (emphasis added). In any event, this Court held that
there was no bad faith by the insurer in filing a declaratory action to challenge portions of the
arbitration award. Id., 140 at 403.
Plaintiffs later refer to Inland Group of Companies v. Providence Washington Ins. Co.,
133 Idaho 249,985 P.2d 674 (1999) and Chester v. State Farm Ins. Co., 117 Idaho 538,789 P.2d
534 (Ct. App. 1990). See Respondents' Brief; pp. 13-14. Both of these cases are inapposite as
well. First, both Inland and Chester were property loss claims. This is significant because the
value of lost property generally is easily ascertained, unlike a physical injury where treatment or
diagnosis may take place over significant period of time and require experts to fully evaluate.
Second, neither of these cases required the insurer to make multiple payments based on a stream
of bills or demands. For instance, in Inland, the insurer failed to timely make payment

after it

had obtained full and complete documentation from the insured to prove the loss, and had
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conducted its own investigation. Inland, 133 Idaho at 252. In Chester, the claimant had likewise
submitted or attempted to submit a full set of documentation to support the claim; the finding of
bad faith was premised on poor handling of claims forms, including requiring multiple sets for
the same claim for lost personal property, and "when State Farm finally offered the money it
conceded was due, it is not clear that this offer was made without strings attached." Chester, 117
Idaho at 541.
A similar argument was rejected by the court in Voland v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., 943
P.2d 808 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997). In that case, the plaintiff cited to two cases to support a UM bad
faith claim for failure to pay undisputed amounts prior to arbitration of a claim. One of the cases
involved a property loss claim where the carrier was held liable in bad faith for failing to pay the
undisputed portion of a claim for stolen jewelry. The second imposed liability on the carrier for
failing to pay lost income benefits under an automobile policy until after a long delay. The court
rejected the application of those cases to a UM case, explaining:

Borland and Filasky did not involve UM claims. They are not
controiling and do no preclude summary judgment for the carriers
here. Unlike the stolen personal property and lost earnings
involved in those cases, a personal injury claim is unique and
generally not divisible or susceptible to relatively precise
evaluation or calculation. The "pain and suffering"lgenera1 damage
elements of a personal injury claim, for example, are inherently
flexible and subject to differing and potentially changing
evaluations based on various factors. [footnote and citation
omitted]. In short, evaluating personal injury claims, and
particularly the "general damage" component, if far from an exact
science. Oftentimes it is no more precise or predictable than
throwing darts at a board.
Voland, 943 P.2d at 812-13. In its footnote, the court noted that

-
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Evaluation of a personal injury (including UM) claim often takes
into account such factors as any liability issues (including
negligence and causation); the claimant's out-of-pocket expenses,
or "special damages"; up-dated medical reports or discovery of old
medical records showing pre-existing or prior claims; evidence of
malingering, subsequent accidents or new injuries; qualifications,
appearance and demeanor of the claimant and his or her witnesses;
reputation and effectiveness of counsel; findings from any
surveillance efforts; and selection and background of the
arbitrators.

Voland, 943 P.2d at 813 n. 3. For the same reasons, Chester and Inland are not controlling here
and did not decide the issue presently before this Court.

2.

Plaintiffs' Have Twisted the Policy Language.

Having seen that lump sum payments in Anderson and Reichert, or failure to pay for
"[ylears after the accident" in Reichert, was not sufficient for bad faith, Plaintiffs next attempt to
argue that the language of the policy requires multiple payments. Plaintiffs acknowledge that the
policy states that "our payment is based on the

amount that

an insured is legally entitled to

recover for bodily injury but could not collect from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor
vehicle." Respondents' Brief; p. 12 (emphasis from Respondents). To get around the
inconvenient fact that "payment" is in the singular, Plaintiffs present a convoluted argument that
"'Payment' does not strictly define a one-time event," but contend that it encompasses "part

Respondents' Brief; p. 13. BLACK'SLAW
payment" citing to BLACK'SLAW DICTIONARY.
DICTIONARY,
however, does not state that payment "encompasses" part payment, but merely
groups "part payment" as a related definition under "payment" together with "affirmative
defense," "balloon payment," "payment into court," and "voluntary payment." The entry for
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"payment" also refers to compulsory payment, conditional payment, constructive payment, down
payment, final payment, guaranty of payment, installment credit, installment loan, installment
sale, involuntary payment, liquidation, and lump-sum payment. Presumably, using Plaintiffs'
logic, the definition of "payment" in the Policy would also "encompassWall of these as well. In
any event, the dictionary does not define "payment" as being "multiple payments," which is the
thrust of Plaintiffs' argument. Thus, Plaintiffs' argument fails.
Plaintiffs next argue that "the Policy language states that payment was only
the amount rather than

beinn the

'based' on

amount due." Respondents' Brief; p. 13 (emphasis in the

original). Without belaboring the point, it is clear that the amount the insured would be legally
entitled to recover from the tortfeasor is merely the beginning of the analysis of the amount due
under the policy. There may be occasions where the payment would be capped by the policy's
limits of coverage---or other limitations, offsets, or exclusions might apply-although

the

insured may have been legally entitled to a greater amount from the uninsured motorist. Thus,
although Plaintiffs' cited statement is correct, it carries no significance.
In sum, Plaintiffs' arguments are unsupported by the text of the Policy or any reasonable
interpretation thereof. Plaintiffs are essentially arguing that the Court should rewrite the contract
and infuse new terms, which this Court has indicated it cannot do. See McKay v. Boise Project

Bd. of Control, 141 Idaho 463, 471, 111 P.3d 148, 156 (2005); J.R. Simplot v. Chambers, 82
Idaho 104, 110,350 P.2d 21 1 (1960). See also Lovey v. Regence Blueshield of Idaho, 139 Idaho
37, 41-42, 72 P.3d 877, 881-82 (2003) ("Courts do not posses the roving power to rewrite
contracts in order to make them more equitable.").

-
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3.

Plaintiffs Misinterpret the Role of the Jury.

Plaintiffs next contend that "[tlhe jury had ample facts and argument from both sides on
the meaning and effect of 'payment' and 'amount,' and determined in Weinsteins' favor." There
are two problems with Plaintiffs' argument. First, it is entirely speculative as to how the jury
interpreted the language of the contract because the special verdict form did not ask the jury
about the effect of "payment" or "amount." Second, and more significantly, there was never any
determination by the trial court that the contract was ambiguous and, accordingly, its
interpretation was a question of law rather than fact. See Lamprecht v. Jordan, LLC, 139 Idaho
182, 185,75 P.3d 743,746 (2003). See also Respondents' BrieJ p. 13 (conceding that there is no
ambiguity as to the contract). Thus, the issue was outside the purview of the jury.

4.

Plaintiffs Have Misapplied I.C. S 41-1329.

Plaintiffs next argue that Idaho Code § 41-1329 creates a duty to pay within 30-days of
"proof-of-loss," citing to Martin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 244, 61 P.3d 601
(2002). Plaintiffs' reasoning is faulty. First, § 41-1329 does

require an insurer to make

payment within 30-days, but only provides for attorneys' fees as additional compensation if
payment is not tendered within that time.' See Martin, 138 Idaho at 247. Martin does not hold
that payment must be made within 30-days irrespective of other considerations, nor does Martin
(or any other case) hold that the failure to do so is unreasonable or constitutes bad faith.
Additionally, Plaintiffs' argument violates well known rules governing the interpretation of a

'

In many cases, it may take more than 30-days simply to collect medical records, let alone
undertake any meaningful evaluation. Even here, it presumably took Plaintiffs' counsel nearly
six (6) months to collect and forward Sarah's records.

-
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statute, including the most basic: that if a statute is not ambiguous, the language will be given its
plain and ordinary meaning. Spelius v. Hollon, 143 Idaho 565, 567, 149 P.3d 840, 842 (2006).
Plaintiffs' interpretation violates this rule by attempting to engraft a requirement into the statute
which is not apparent from the plain text.
Second, even if $ 41-1839 does establish the time in which payment

be made,

Defendants complied with the statute. As noted in Defendants' Statement of Facts in Appellants'

Briex

7 14-17, Plaintiffs have never submitted a complete proof of loss in that: (i) they never

made a demand (written or otherwise) prior to filing suit for Sarah's future medical expenses or
general damages; (ii) they never submitted any records or other evidence to document Sarah's
claims for future medical expenses or general damages; (iii) they never submitted a demand for a
sum certain as to future medical expenses or general damages as required by this Court. Carter v.

Cascade Ins. Co., 92 Idaho 136, 138,438 P.2d 566 (1968), overruled in part on other grounds,
Associates Discount Corp. v. Yosemite Ins. Co., 96 Idaho 249, 526 P.2d 854 (1974). See also
Associates Discount Corp., 96 Idaho at 257 ("the result reached in the Carter decision was
correct in view of the fact that the proof o f claim filed with the insurer did not mention a suecific

sum and therefore no tender could be made ....") (emphasis added). Thus, Plaintiffs bad no right
to a tender under $ 41-1839.
Even as to the past-medical expenses, the medical records and bills promised by Plaintiffs
in November 2003 were not provided to Defendants until after May 20, 2004, and Defendants
responded by offering $10,000 within 30-days. To put this in context, Plaintiffs had incurred less
than $14,500 in total medical bills of which Defendants' had already paid $5,000, and there were

-
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additional amounts that had been paid by Plaintiffs health carriec2 Thus, Defendants were
tendering enough to pay off all of Plaintiffs' outstanding medical bills, any bills or expenses that
the Plaintiffs' had paid out-of-pocket, and to repay Plaintiffs' health carrier (although Plaintiffs
had not informed Defendants of any asserted subrogation interest, see LC. Ej 6-1606), plus more.
5.

There Are Legitimate Reasons to Not Making Partial Pavments.

Plaintiffs next argue that there was a "complete absence of any legitimate reason

... to

withhold payment" of UM benefits. Respondents' Brief; p. 15. Plaintiffs make this assertion
without advancing one iota of argument to support their conclusion. Nevertheless, Defendants
assert that there are legitimate reasons for delaying payment. For instance, Defendants have an
interest in investigating and evaluating the bodily injury claim as a whole. Plaintiffs have (or
should have) an interest in obtaining a single payment for medical expenses in order to have
greater leverage in compromising hospital liens, claims from other providers, or the subrogation
interests asserted by health insurers.
As this Court has previously noted, "an insurer cannot be held in bad faith for standing
upon its rights under the policy." Inland, 133 Idaho at 256. MedPay coverage is premised on the
medical bills being related to an accident regardless of fault, and typically involve relatively
small amounts-in

this case, the limits were $5,000. Conversely, UM is premised on what an

insured would have been legally entitled to recover for bodily harm from the uninsured motorist,
and the amounts at issue tend to be much larger-in

See R. 392-405, Ex. 10157.
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this case, the policy limits were $250,000.

While emergency and short term care following an accident is usually related to tbat
accident, later treatment may be wholly or partially due to pre-existing conditions or postaccident trauma unrelated to the covered event. Some bills may be completely unrelated to the
claimant's injury. An insured's demands may not be supported by the medical records. In many
cases, a claimant may not provide an accurate or complete history to a treating physician-for
instance, failing to mention a prior injury or accident-which

information may only he

discovered by reviewing other records. Unscrupulous claimants may exaggerate damages and
fabricate evidence. Thus, it behooves an insurer attempting to adjust a UM claim to examine the
whole record, or at least as much of the claimant's medical records and history as can reasonably
be obtained.
In this case, for instance, Plaintiffs forwarded a bill for payment by Defendants where the
description of services simply stated "BALANCE FORWARD." See R. 392-405, Ex. 10095
(Bates # PRU 001362). Such a bill would require more support than simply Plaintiffs' word that
it was related to the accident. Plaintiffs had also asserted that Defendants were responsible to pay
bills for an urinalyses and rapid shep test unrelated in any way to the accident3 R. 392-405, Ex.
10117 (Bates #s PRU 655 and PRU 670) (March 20 and 25, 2003 billings from McMillan
Medical Center). Based on the medical records finally provided by Plaintiffs, it was questionable
whether Sarah may have suffered an aggravation of her injury because of playing soccer. It was
unknown at the time (and not clear even now) whether Sarah might have suffered prior injuries

Unfortunately, as to these billings, Plaintiffs' chicanery worked since these were paid by
Defendants under the MedPay benefits.

-
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from her numerous sporting activities or other automobile accidents. As noted in the Defendants'
prior briefing, when Plaintiffs finally made a demand, because of errors and double counting,
Plaintiffs overstated Sarah's medical expenses by over $10,000. Consequently, even if
Defendants were satisfied from their initial investigation that the uninsured motorist had
breached a legal duty, Defendants were still entitled to investigate the claim, including obtaining
medical records, prior to paying on the claim. See also Voland, supra, 943 P.2d at 813 n. 3
(noting various factors that go into valuating a bodily injury-including
6.

UMGclaim).

The Pay-in-Advance Agreement.

Nowhere does the Plaintiffs' own bad-faith show more clearly than with their response to
Defendants' attempt to advance them money on the final settlement of the case. Despite
assertions that they were in dire financial straits, Plaintiffs (or rather, their attorney) waited five
months before sending any medical records after his promise to do so, waited another month
before forwarding certain items that he forget to include in the first packet, and then, when
Defendants offered to advance $10,000 while waiting for Plaintiffs' counsel to complete a
settlement and demand package, Plaintiffs rejected the offer and filed suit without any attempt to
discuss or resolve their concerns.
The Pay-in-Advance (PIA) Agreement that Plaintiffs now complain about provided:
In consideration of our payment in the amount of $10,000.00
dollars as an advance and credit against a final settlement of Sarah
Weinstein's Uninsured Motorist claim from the 9130102 accident, it
is mutually agreed:
This payment by Liberty Mutual Insurance (Prudential
1)
Property & Casualty's successors in interest) does not constitute an
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admission of any liability by the uninsured motorist, Brittany
Hardan, for any damages Sarah Weinstein has sustained in the
above-described accident.
This payment does not constitute a promise by Liberty
2)
Mutual Insurance to make further payment in advance of the final
settlement of Sarah Weinstein's claim.
Your acceptance of this payment does not constitute a final
3)
settlement or release of Sarah Weinstein's claim.
By accepting this payment you agree that the amount of
4)
this and any previous payment in advance of final settlement will
be credited against and subtracted from the amount of any final
settlement under the policy's Uninsured Motorist coverage because
of the 9130102 accident.
By accepting this payment you agree and understand that
5)
the coverage afforded by [sic] Liberty Mutual Insurance policy and
applicable to Sarah Weinstein's claim from the 9/30/02 accident is
reduced to the extent of this and any previous payment made in
advance of final settlement and judgment.
By tendering this payment, Liberty Mutual does not intend
6)
to waive, but rather specifically reserves all of its rights including,
but not limited to, defenses which may be applicable to this claim.
R. 392-405, Ex. 10128. Buddy Paul testified that in his practice, he has signed many "stand still"
agreements similar to the PIA Agreement here, and testified that this particular Agreement
merely clarified that "nobody [was] gaining or losing any rights." See Revised Tr. (9125107) p.

Obviously, Plaintiffs cannot argue that the amount offered was inadequate. At the time
the PIA Agreement was sent to Plaintiffs' counsel in June 2004, Plaintiffs had only sent a written
demand for payment of medical bills incurred through November 2003. As noted earlier, Sarah's

-
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total medical

expenses were less than $14,500.~Of this, $5,000 had already been paid by

~efendants.'Thus, the $10,000 exceeded not only the outstanding medical bills, but would have
exceeded (together with the $5,000 already paid) the total medical expenses.
Plaintiffs instead argue that the PIA Agreement was in bad faith because it "reserv[ed] 4
legal defenses to Appellants." Respondents' Brief, p. 16. Plaintiffs never explain why this
constitutes bad faith, particularly because the PIA Agreement also preserved Plaintiffs' legal
rights. Nevertheless, since "an insurer cannot be held in bad faith for standing upon its rights
under the policy," Inland, 133 Idaho at 256, it would follow that an insurer cannot be held to bad
faith for standing upon or preserving its legal rights-including

legal defenses.

Plaintiffs also contend that the PIA Agreement was intended to distract Plaintiffs from an
impending statute of limitations, explaining: "UM liability was not an issue for two years after
the accident, but by the release it would become an absolute claim defense if [the] Weinsteins
did not file suit against the uninsured tortfeasor before September 30,2004." Respondents' Brief,
p. 16. Plaintiffs' argument is disingenuous. First, there are no Idaho decisions allowing an insurer
to avoid liability under a UM or UIM policy simply because suit was not filed against the
uninsured motorist, so Plaintiffs' argument doesn't make sense from a legal perspective. Second,
Defendants were not dealing with an unsophisticated, unrepresented party-Plaintiffs

were

represented by legal counsel. Plaintiffs have never explained how the Agreement would have
been capable of misleading their attorney. Third, and most significantly, Plaintiffs never filed

The specific amount was $14,121.50. See R. 392-405, Ex. 10157.
Several thousand dollars more had been paid by Plaintiffs' health carrier.

-
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suit against the uninsured tortfeasor, yet Defendants never raised this as a defense. Obviously, if
Defendants had wanted to assert a statute of limitations defense for failure to sue the third-party
tortfeasor, Defendants would have actually asserted the issue at some point in the litigation. In
short, Plaintiffs argument is disproven by the simple fact that, as documented by the record, it
never happened.
7.

Payments After Initiation of the Lawsuit.

Plaintiffs' next argument is based on the concept of "damned if you do, damned if you
don't." That is, after complaining and arguing that Defendants had a policy of not making partial
payments, Plaintiffs then have the gall to complain about Defendants later making three (3)
payments to pay off medical bills and general damages. See Respondents' Brie& pp. 8 and 17.
Initially, Defendants would note that use of evidence as to when and how payments were
made following suit are improper. See I.R.E. 408 (evidence of compromises not admissible).
Furthermore, since Plaintiffs had not raised this particular argument below, Defendants would
assert that it is improper for Plaintiffs to raise it now.
There is also nothing inconsistent in Defendants' actions. Defendants never testified to a
formal policy prohibiting piecemeal payment, hut the testimony was that a single universal
settlement was the standard practice of the adjusters primarily because they had never had an
attorney or party attempt to settle a UM claim on a piecemeal basis6 See, e.g., Tr. (9/21107) p.

Plaintiffs argue that three practicing Idaho attorneys testified that it is an industry practice in
Idaho for insurers to pay undisputed UM benefits in advance of a final settlement, although
Plaintiffs have failed to direct the Court to that testimony. See Respondents' Brief p. 9. However,
there is again nothing inconsistent as to Defendants' actions. If the claims handling had been
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844, L1. 9-21. On the other hand, Plaintiffs asserted that Defendants were under a legal
obligation to pay the hills as submitted to them by Plaintiffs. While Defendants questioned
whether there was any such legal obligation (and Plaintiffs have yet to produce any Idaho case or
statute to support this theory), Defendants did not foreclose the possibility either, and requested
that Plaintiffs' counsel forward medical records so Defendants could evaluate the claim.7 See
Appellants' Brief: pp. 7-9. After receiving the records from Plaintiffs, Defendants quickly offered
to make a payment of $10,000 in advance of a final ~ettlement.~
8.

First-Par@ Status.

Plaintiffs next attack Defendants' argument that collecting and analyzing a UM claim as
a whole is consistent with the purposes of UM policies, i.e., "to afford the same protection to a
person injured by an uninsured motorist as would have been enjoyed had the tortfeasor carried
liability insurance." Ryals v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 134 Idaho 302, 307, 1 P.3d 803, 808
(2000). Plaintiffs first attempt to distinguish Ryals by arguing that it only applies to a "no-fault
insurance conflict of laws situation." Respondents' Brief: p. 18. However, even a brief review of

allowed to run its course instead of Plaintiffs filing suit, there would have been a $10,000
payment; an evaluation to include future medical expenses and general damages followed by a
payment of the undisputed amount; and, if the policy limits had not been exhausted, a further
demand by Plaintiffs for more money, which would likely have resulted in a final negotiation
and payment of the "disputed amount." Even without the $10,000 prepayment, there probably
would have been two payments-the initial payment of the undisputed amount and, after some
negotiation, a second payment in final settlement of the "disputed amount."
As has been noted, Plaintiffs' counsel had revoked the medical records releases, and insisted
that he would provide the medical records to the Defendants. See Appellants' BrieJ p. 8-9.
At that point in time, the demand from Plaintiffs' counsel was only for payment of medical
expenses through November 2003, and that Plaintiffs' counsel had not forwarded any records or
made any demands for any later medical expenses, future medical expenses, or general damages

-
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Ryals and the case to which it cited, Sloviaczek v. Estate of Puckett, 98 Idaho 371, 378, 565 P.2d

564, 571 (1977), show that the court's comments were in no way tied to conflict of laws
situations.
Plaintiffs cannot even correctly articulate Defendants' argument, stating: "[Tlheir
company policy is a conscious decision to handle Weinsteins' claim, like all their UM claims, as
if dealing with third parties." Respondents' BrieJ; p. 18. Defendants' argument was actually that
Defendants' procedures were consistent with the policy set out in Ryals. The mere existence of a
first party relationship between Defendants and the Plaintiffs does not obviate Plaintiffs' duty to
support their claims with some objective facts, or eliminate Defendants right to investigate the
claim before making payment. Again, Plaintiffs objective in this suit is to turn UM coverage
from paying based on what Plaintiffs could have legally recovered from the uninsured tortfeasor
into a type of "super med-pay" where fault is irrelevant and only the barest minimum of causality
required. This is a novel theory and an issue of first impression! Thus, if the Court agrees with
Plaintiffs' theory, Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. If the Court does not
agree with Plaintiffs' theory, then Defendants acted consistent with their rights under the contract
and law and are still entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

This is also a theory that is inconsistent with the plain language of the insurance policy. Again,
Plaintiffs are asking the Court to insert new terms into the written agreement.

-
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C.

PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO PROVE BAD FAITH.

1.

The Payments Were Made in a Reasonable Time.

Plaintiffs have failed to prove aprima facie case of bad faith. Plaintiffs had the burden of
proving that the insurer intentionally

unreasonable denied or withheld payment. Plaintiffs

whole basis for the "unreasonable" prong-the

theory that the trial court accepted as the law in

Idaho--was that Defendants had to make a stream of payments as medical bills were incurred or
submitted to Defendants, and it was &so facto unreasonable not to do so. (Apparently Plaintiffs
also maintain that without any information or demands from Plaintiffs or medical doctors,
Defendants were also supposed to somehow divine Sarah's future medical expenses and general
damages). As noted above and in Defendants' initial briefing, there are very good reasons why
UM coverage is different from MedPay or health insurance which make it reasonable to evaluate
the claim at some higher level than every individual bill.
Another issue here is the length of time. Plaintiffs argued, and the trial court supported,
that the delay in this matter was for a period beginning when Sarah was injured, or at least once a
claim file was opened. Thus, Plaintiffs argued to the jury and has argued to this Court that the
delay in payments was nearly 2 years. Defendants have consistently argued that no demand for
partial payment was made prior to September 2003, when Mrs. Weinstein contacted the UM
adjuster after the MedPay benefits were exhausted in August; and that even as to past medical
expenses (i.e., those incurred through November 2003), no actual proof necessary to conduct an
examination was even tendered until May 2004. Thus, even if a partial evaluation and payment
was required, the clock did not start running until late May 2004. This is supported by decisions
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from other jurisdictions permitting partial payment. See Keefe v. Prudential Prop. and Gas. Ins.
Go., 203 F.3d 218 (3" Cir. 2000).
In Keefe, the plaintiff had suffered three injuries in an automobile accident caused by an
uninsured motorist. Two of the injuries-to
accident; the third-to

a wrist-was

her shoulder and k n e e w e r e clearly the result of the

not clearly related because of a pre-existing condition. The

plaintiff sued her insurer alleging bad faith for failing to pay UM benefits on the two causally
undisputed injuries. The facts showed that the plaintiff was injured in August 1995, and
contacted her insurer the next day concerning the accident. She initially only claimed damages to
her shoulder and knee, but added a claim for her wrist in February 1996. The plaintiff underwent
surgery in February, April and July 1996 for her three injuries. At some point, the plaintiffs
attorney had promised to provide medical records concerning plaintiffs pre-existing wrist injury.
Although he had not yet done so, he nevertheless requested that Prudential settle the plaintiffs
entire claim at or near policy limits on three occasions between March and June of 1996. The
plaintiffs attorney finally provided the requested medical records in December 1996. On
January 21, 1997, the plaintiffs attorney first advised Prudential that his client was having
financial difficulty and requested that Prudential make at least a partial payment. By the end of
January 1997, Prudential offered to settle the claim for policy limits of $200,000, which payment
was made on March 3, 1997. The plaintiff filed her bad faith suit in May 1997. See generally
Keefe, 203 F.3d at 221.

-
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On appeal, the Third Circuit held that an insured could demand a partial evaluation and
payment of a UM claim. However, the court noted that there would be two conditions to such
payment:
The first is that the insurance company conducted, or the insured
requested but was denied, a separate assessment of some part of
her claim (i.e., that there was an undisputed amount). The second
is, at least until such a duty is clearly established in law (so that the
duty is a known duty), that the insured made a request for partial
payment.

Id. at 226. As to the latter point, the court explained: "A request for a partial final assessment or
evidence that the insurer conducted such a partial final assessment is a precondition of success
on a bad faith claim because of the subjective components of a pain and suffering reward." Id.
"Until a plaintiff makes a request for partial payment, the insurance company has no notice that
the plaintiff claims a partial payment." Id. at 227. Thus, the court held:
Without a request for partial payment, and unless and until [the
State] recognizes a duty to make partial payments, we believe that
an insurance company does not act in bad faith when it assumes
that an insured desires settlement of the entire claim, at least where
the contract provides for general damages, and does not explicitly
require separate assessments and payments for separate injuries in
the calculation of compensatory damages. We do not believe [the
State] would require an insurance company-on its own
initiative-to determine whether a partial payment is due under an
UM contract before information regarding all of the injuries has
been provided to it. To require such initiative would be tantamount
to imposing a duty on the insurance company above and beyond
the duty imposed by the implied duty of good faith and fair
dealing.
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Id. Based on this holding and the fact that the plaintiff had not made a demand for partial
payment until January 1997, the court ruled that plaintiff could not make out a claim for had faith
and that Prudential was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 228.
In this case, even if there was a duty to make one or more partial payments, the trial court
and jury failed to consider the appropriate time period when deciding whether Defendants acted
in bad faith. As Defendants have consistently argued, the appropriate time frame was not until at
least late May 2004 when the promised medical records were finally delivered to Defendants.
Thus, the delay to evaluate those records, tender the $10,000 and make payment despite the
Plaintiffs own had faith in filing suit, was not an unreasonable delay.''
2.

The Claims Were Falrlv Debatable.

The Plaintiffs claim was fairly debatable. First, as discussed more fully above, the
demand for piecemeal payments is a matter of first impression-it

was not an issue raised in, or

decided by, Inland or Chester. See Vaught v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 131 Idaho 357, 362, 956 P.2d
674, 679 (1998) ("...when a claim involves a legal question of first impression, an insurer does
not commit bad faith by litigating the claim even if the insurer does'not prevail."). Nor is the
duty to provide partial payments universally recognized. See Keefe, supra, 203 F.3d at 225
(noting a division among jurisdictions on this issue).
Second, there was an issue about a possible aggravation of injuries which is well
documented in Defendants' adjuster's notes shortly after receipt of Sarah's medical records and

Notably, Plaintiffs have never presented any evidence that Defendants could have collected the
records any sooner than Mr. Bistline.
lo
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weeks before Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit. See Appellant's BrieJ Statement of Facts

16. See

also Voland, supra, 943 P.2d at 813 n. 3 (noting, among other factors, that evaluation of a bodily
injury claim includes examination of "evidence of malingering, subsequent accidents or new
injuries"). Whether or not this was concern was borne out by later review by medical experts, it
was a legitimate concern at the time.
Third, Plaintiffs never presented a demand or proof of loss as to future medical expenses
or general damages. Since Plaintiffs argue that Idaho Code

9 42-1839 is relevant to this issue,

then Plaintiffs were required to include with their demand or proof of loss a demand for a sum
certain, which they failed to do. Associates Discount Corp. v. Yosemite Ins. Co., 96 Idaho 249,
257, 526 P.2d 854 (1974); Carter v. Cascade Ins. Co., 92 Idaho 136, 138,438 P.2d 566 (1968).
Plaintiffs state that the "information" concerning future medical expenses and general damages
was made available to prior to suit, but have failed to provide a single citation to the record
showing where that information was made available. Rather, there was no medical opinion or
prognosis provided to Defendants concerning Sarah's hture medical needs, if any, and no
statements or other information provided about her limitations or other factors that bore on her
claims for general damages.
Fourth, as set forth more fully in Defendants' opening brief, there is disputed medical
evidence concerning Sarah's need for future treatment including hip surgery; and the medical
evidence presented was insufficient as a matter of law to support a jury verdict. That is, neither
of the medical experts said on either a "reasonable degree of medical certainty" or "more

-
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probable than not" basis that Sarah would need hip surgery; and the two doctors could not even
agree whether Sarah would develop arthritis or other impairment.
Finally, Plaintiffs' assertion that Defendants' "valued" the claim at certain amounts is a
blatant misstatement of the facts. The "values" cited by Plaintiffs were the reserve amounts set
for this case at various times prior to suit being filed. The $150,000 is a complete fabrication
because the reserves were never raised to that amount. See Tr. (9121107) p. 915, Ll. 1-5.
Moreover, Plaintiffs mischaracterize the purpose of reserves, which is to ensure that an
insurance company has set aside sufficient funds "for the liquidation of future unaccrued and
contingent claims, and claims accrued, but contingent and indefinite as to amount." BLACK'S
LAWDICT.906 (6Ih ed. abridged). See also Cleveland Bar Assoc. v. CompManagement Inc., 857
N.E.2d 95, 110 n. 17 (Ohio 2006) ("A 'reserve' is a prediction of how much of the cost of a
particular existing claim remains to be paid, i.e., how much more the claim will cost beyond
what has already been paid."); Tr. (9125107) p. 620 L. 25 - p. 622 L. 11 (testimony of "Buddy"
Paul, Defendants' insurance expert, describing reserves as "an estimate of potential future risk
and exposure"). Reserves are required by Idaho statute. See LC.

5

41-609. "Reserves" do not

represent the "settlement value" or "undisputed amount" of a claim. See Molony v. USAA

Proper& and Cas. Ins. Co., 708 So. 2d 1220, 1226 (La. Ct. App. 1998) ("We simply do not
equate 'reserve' with 'undisputed amount."'); Williams v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 750 A.2d
881, 886-87 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) ("Likewise, the amount of reserves set aside by the insurer
pursuant to claims filed by an insured cannot be construed as 'undisputed amounts.' Reserves are
merely amounts set aside by insurers to cover potential future liabilities.").

-
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This Court rejected a similar argument in Vaught v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 131 Idaho 357,
956 P.2d 674 (1998), where the plaintiff argued that an offer of settlement amounted to an
admission of liability. In Vaught, the plaintiff was injured in a collision with an Air Force truck
stopped on the interstate highway. Vaught's insurer, Dairyland, investigated the accident and
determined that Vaught was 50% at fault and settled a claim submitted by the Air Force for
$15,000. The Vaughts subsequently sued the Air Force and prevailed at trial. ThereaRer, based
on the judgment from the Federal Court, the Vaught's sued Dairyland in state court for breach of
contract and bad faith. Dairyland offered to settle the suit for $25,000, which offer was rejected
by Vaught. The District Court granted summary judgment to Vaught for breach of contract, but
granted summary judgment to Dairyland on the bad faith claims, which decision was appealed
by Vaught. The Supreme Court upheld the summary judgment in favor of Dairyland, explaining
in part:
The Vaughts argue that Dairyland's offer to settle the state court
action for the policy limits amounts to an admission by Dairyland
that it was liable and, therefore, Dairyland's rehsal to pay benefits
unless the Vaughts signed a liability release was had faith. We
cannot agree. Daiwland's adjuster testified that the $25,000 firrure
was not an estimate of liability. but was instead based on a number
of factors. The case cited by the Vaughts in support of their
argument, Chester v. State Farm Insurance Co., ... is inapposite. In
Chester, the insurer conceded that it owed benefits to the insured.
In this case, Dairyland contends ... [it] did not owe the Vaughts
any benefits under the uninsured motorist provision of the policy.

Vaught, 131 Idaho at 362 (emphasis added). In other words, the Court agreed that an insurer's
appraisal of the value of the case may be based on factors other than the insurer's assessment of
its liability. See also Voland, 943 P.2d at 81 1-812 (rejecting argument that $30,000 settlement
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offer made prior to an arbitration represented the undisputed amount of the plaintiffs UM
claim).
In short, insurance reserves, as a matter of law, cannot be equated to or accepted as the
undisputed amount owed on the claim.
3.

Honest Mistake.

Plaintiffs' argument here concerns the medical authorizations, to-wit: "Appellants cannot
explain why for the first year they did nothing with the authorizations." Respondents' Brief, p.
21. Actually, Defendants attempted to use the releases when it was reasonable to do so. As noted
earlier, the first release from the UM adjuster was not returned until December 2002. At that
point, the MedPay provided coverage primary to the UM and was ostensibly providing benefits.
Moreover, even if Defendants had a duty to perform a partial evaluation and settlement,
Plaintiffs had not requested it. Keefe, 203 F.3d at 227. The second release was used by the
MedPay adjuster to obtain bills and records. Both of these medical releases were rendered void
by the HIPAA regulations that took effect in the spring of 2003. The UM adjuster attempted to
use the third release, but could not immediately do so until the list of medical providers was sent
by Plaintiffs. Almost immediately after that list was received, Plaintiffs' attorney terminated the
releases and said he would provide the records.
Plaintiffs also contend that Defendants' actions do not amount to an "honest mistake,"
citing to Robinson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 173, 178, 45 P.3d 829 (2002).
Plaintiffs' reliance is misplaced. First, the definition given in Robinson was not from this Court,
hut was a quote of a jury instruction from the district court. Second, the Robinson court held that
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the jury instructions improperly allocated the burden of proof and reversed the judgment on those
grounds. Thus, any approval of the jury instructions is dicta. Third, the definition as quoted by
the Robinson court does not reflect the actual state of Idaho law because it inserts a negligence
standard into what is an intentional tort. See Robinson, 137 Idaho at 178 (instruction stated that
"[a] mistake which is the result of negligence or inattention or indifference is not an honest
mistake.").
4.

Plaintiffs' Damages Were Fully Comaensable Under Contract Damages.

Plaintiffs' agree that "[iln bad faith cases the emotion [sic] distress must be extreme and
outrageous." Respondents' Brief p. 24 (citing Walston v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 129 Idaho
21 1,219,923 P.2d 456,465 (1996)). However, Walston and Davis v. Gage, 106 Idaho 735, 741,
682 P.2d 1282, 1288 (Ct. App. 1984) both applied negligent and intentional infliction of
emotional distress standards to claims of emotional distress made in a bad faith claim. Accord,

Windsor v. Guarantee Trust Life Ins. Co., 684 F. Supp. 630, 632 (D. Idaho 1988). The only
person claiming emotional distress was Mrs. Weinstein, and she did not plead or testifjr about
having physical manifestations of distress, which made it appropriate to apply the standards for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. As detailed in Defendants' opening brief, Mrs.
Weinstein's symptoms were like those of the plaintiff in Davis-a

plaintiff that the Davis court

held, as a matter of law, had not shown sufficiently extreme distress to claim damages.
Accordingly, the district court erred by not properly instructing the jury as to the requirements of
the emotional distress claim, and erred by not granting judgment andlor a new trial to
Defendants.

-

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 28

D.

THE COURT CO5lMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY INSTRUCTING THE
JURY AS TO THE UNFAIR CI,AI.MS SETTI.E.1IEKT PRACTICES ACT.

There is no private cause of action for a violation of the Unfair Claims Settlement
Practices Act. Simper v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 471,475,974 P.2d 1100, 1104
(1999); White v Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94, 101, 730 P.2d 1014, 1021 (1986). In

Walston, supra, this Court only held that an expert's testimony concerning the Act was not
improper because it was limited to showing insurance industry standards. Walston, 129 Idaho at
216. Accord, Inland Group of Cos. v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 133 Idaho 249, 258, 985 P.2d
674 (1999) Significantly, the Court did not hold that the testimony concerning the Act was @so

facto relevant and admissible, hut emphasized its status as mere evidence, looking at whether it
was relevant and whether the probative value outweighed any unfair prejudicial effect. See

Walston, 129 Idaho at 216. In this case, there was no testimony concerning the Act. The trial
court's inclusion of the Act in the jury instructions changed the Act from potential evidence of
the industry standard to the law governing bad faith claims. Moreover, by doing so, the trial
court improperly created a private cause of action for violation of the Act. Inclusion of the Act in
the jury instructions is reversible error, and Defendants are entitled to a new trial.
E.

THE PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARD MUST BE REVERSED

The Court must set aside the large punitive damage award here. Plaintiffs cannot justify
the series of prejudicial errors leading to that award.

-
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1.

The Weinsteins' Bad Faith Claim Did Not Accrue Before July 1.2003.

Plaintiffs admit, as they must, that Mr. and Mrs. Weinstein's bad faith claim had to
accrue before July 1, 2003 to avoid the Idaho statutory cap on punitive damages. See
Respondents' Brief; p. 26. Plaintiffs do not dispute that a claim does not accrue until there are
damages or that, under their theory of the case, no damages accrued until they submitted medical
bills for payment under the UM provisions that were not paid. Appellants' Brief; p. 24-25.
Plaintiffs also concede that their Complaint did not allege any acts of bad faith relating to the
UM coverage until after July 1, 2003. Instead of recognizing the logical result of these
concessions-that

the statute caps the punitive damages here-plaintiffs

offer the irrelevant

argument that their complaint was only required to put the adverse party "on notice of the
claims" and contend that the specific events alleged in the complaint were just "two of many
events of a broad bad faith claim" based on the "entire handling of Weinsteins' claims."
Respondents' Brief; p. 26.
Rather than cite any trial evidence to show the Weinsteins' claim accrued before July 1,
2003, Plaintiffs present nine numbered contentions, most of which are not tied to any event
occurring before July 1, 2003. Respondents' Brief; p. 27. Using the unsupported contentions on
page 7 of their Brief and the scant evidence of pre-July 2003 events cited on pages 3-4, Plaintiffs
try to conflate the MedPay claim-as
damages-with

to which the jury found no bad faith and awarded no

the separate UM claim. These contentions do not justify the court's backdating

of the UM claim because none of the contentions amounts to evidence that damages relating to
the UM claim accrued before July 2003:
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1.

Paragraph #I states that the policy does not contain "triggering" language
defining when the UM claim commenced, but is silent about when damages
accrued..

2.

Paragraph #2 contends, without evidence, that Defendants opened a UM claim
file the day after the accident..

3.

Paragraph #3 contends, without evidence, that the MedPay claim was closed and
inactivated in February 2003. This argument reveals Plaintiffs' efforts to conflate
their claims..

4.

Paragraph #4 contends, without evidence, that the Defendants' UM claims
department "valued Sarah's UM claim within days of the accident" and, on an
unspecified date, "increased the value to $25,000.00." This is neither an allegation
of bad faith nor evidence regarding when damages accrued.

5.

Paragraph #5 contends, without evidence, that Defendants' UM claim department
requested an initial medical authorization and provider list in December 2002.

6.

Paragraph #6 contends, without evidence, that the UM personnel "failed to
adequately investigate their own UM file," but does not identify when any
particular actions occurred.

7.

Paragraph #7 contends that Sarah had to endure physical therapy and surgery and
missed school-ignoring that these were unfortunate results of the auto accident,
not damages from alleged bad faith under the UM claim. It also ignores that Mr.
and Mrs. Weinstein, not Sarah, are the plaintiffs on the UM bad faith claim.

8.

Paragraph #8 contends, without evidence, that: "Appellants refused to pay any of
the medical bills." This paragraph fails to specify when Plaintiffs submitted
medical bills in excess of the MedPay limit that were not paid.

9.

Finally, Paragraph #9 contends, without evidence and again without any
specification of the time period, that the Weinsteins made the UM adjusters
"aware of their financial hardships," etc.

The critical question here is when UM damages accrued, yet Plaintiffs' litany of contentions is
curiously devoid of a specific answer.

-
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Echoing their unsupported contentions and ignoring the jury's rejection of their MedPay
bad faith claim, Plaintiffs argue on page 28 of their brief that the bad faith "began at least as
early as December 2002" because Defendants failed to use the authorization and provider list and
closed and inactivated the MedPay file. Plaintiffs then briefly refer to the "cumulative effect of a
continuing chain of tortuous [sic] activity" to defend the court's reliance on the continuing tort
doctrine to backdate the UM claim. Respondents' BrieJ p. 28. But the Curtis case does not
support Plaintiffs' argument. Instead, the continuing tort doctrine, when applicable, operates to
post-date a claim's accrual when wrongful conduct is repeated by continual unlawful acts. See
Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho 598, 603, 850 P.2d 749,754 (1993) (the cause of action accrues, and
the limitation period begins to run, at the time the tortious conduct ceases). Similarly, McCabe
v. Craven, 145 Idaho 954, 957, 188 P.3d 896, 899 (2007), cited at page 28 of Plaintiffs' brief,
offers no support for Plaintiffs' argument: it merely discusses general principles for when
Section 1983 civil rights claims accrue and supports having a false imprisonment claim accrue
when the detention ends. This is irrelevant here because Plaintiffs contend that their claims
accrued at an earlier date, not a later date. And Plaintiffs' argument that "allocation of damages
across the span of the acts is impractical" adds nothing because it ignores the absence of any
evidence that damages from the UM bad faith claim accrued before July 1, 2003. Because no
acts of bad faith occurred before that date, there is nothing to allocate to that early time period.
Plaintiffs cannot substitute rhetoric (e.g., "In all respects, every element . . . accrued") for
evidence. They did not present evidence showing the UM bad faith claim accrued before July 1,
2003, and therefore they cannot recover punitive damages in excess of the statutory cap.
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2.

Ptaintiffs Did Not Prove C o r ~ o r a t eRatification.

The purpose of the corporate ratification requirement is to ensure that a corporation is
held liable for punitive damages only for actions that its officers or directors participated in,
ratified, or endorsed. Appellants' Brief, p. 26. Defendants proposed jury instructions on this
(Defs. Supp. #10 & #11) before the jury instruction conference, which the court rejected at that
conference, Tr. (9126107) p. 159-61. Defendants' proffer of these instructions was not untimely,
and the court did not rely on timeliness in refusing them. Rather, the court incorrectly held as a
matter of law that sufficient evidence of corporate authorization existed to justifjr a punitive
damages award against the Defendants, citing the "policy manuals." Appellants' Brief, p. 26; R.
323-24; Tr. (9126107) p. 161 in. 10-11. Yet Plaintiffs did not offer into evidence any policy
manuals with unconscionable policies.
The only evidence Plaintiffs now cite to justify the court's erroneous ruling is testimony
where Defendants purportedly admit that Weinsteins' UM claim was handled the way adjusters
are trained to handle UM claims. Respondents' Brief, p. 29 (citing Tr. (9124107) p. 512). But that
testimony is nothing more than statements by Dorothy Quinn, a former casualty analyst for
Prudential who had retired from Liberty Mutual in 2005 (i.e., not a corporate officerldirector),
that she sees "nothing wrong with the way this claim was handled" and that "this claim was
handled the way [she was] trained to handle claims." Tr. (9124107) p. 447, 449, 512. These
generalizations are not evidence that a corporate officer or director participated in, ratified, or
authorized unconscionable conduct that warranted a punitive damage award. The court was
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incorrect to conclude that any evidence of ratification was part of the trial record. Therefore this
Court must set aside the punitive damage award.

3.

Plaintiffs Did Not Prove Unconscionable Conduct.

Defendants demonstrate in their opening brief and elsewhere in this Reply that their
conduct cannot be viewed as outrageous, oppressive, or unconscionable. Instead, as explained by
their expert, Buddy Paul, in his trial testimony, Tr. (9125107) pp. 51-141, they properly addressed
the Weinsteins' UM claim despite interference and lack of cooperation from the Weinsteins and
their counsel.
Plaintiffs argue, without citing any trial evidence, that Defendants engaged in
"fraudulent" conduct by supposedly telling unpaid creditors that policy benefits were
"exhausted." The evidence does not support this contention and it appears to confuse the $5,000
in MedPay benefits with the $250,000 in UM benefits. See Respondents' Brief, p. 29-30;
Appellants' Brief, p. 3-4. That is, the notices that were sent concerning "exhaustion" of policy
benefits only pertained to MedPay benefits. The jury found there was no bad faith as to the
MedPay claims handling, and that verdict has not been appealed.
Plaintiffs also try to illustrate the alleged unconscionable conduct with an argument that
Defendants "repeatedly represented to Weinsteins medical authorizations and provider lists were
required to investigate and evaluate the claim," Respondents' Brief, p. 30, but ignore that such
information is necessary, and ignore the role of the Weinsteins' own attorney, Mr. Bistline, in
blocking access to the Weinsteins' medical records and failing timely to respond to requests that
he facilitate access to the records, Appellants' Brief, p. 7-1 1. Finally, Plaintiffs also single out as

-
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evidence of the supposed unconscionable conduct the Defendants' "$10,000.00 advance payment
plan," which they contend shows "outrageous and oppressive bad faith" because it was a "paltry
offer." Respondents' Brief p. 30. This argument ignores the evidence that the offer of a $10,000
interim payment was an attempt to get some money quickly to the Weinsteins (without any
waiver of their right to obtain more money). That offer reflects a good faith gesture that Mr.
Bistline foolishly stymied just before he filed this lawsuit. Appellants' Brief; p. 10-11.
Plaintiffs' own arguments demonstrate that they cannot identify any evidence of actual
unconscionable conduct. Therefore, the Court should vacate the punitive damage award.
4.

The Court Erred In Allowing The Amended Claim For Punitive Damapes.

While a court has discretion to allow amendments to a complaint, that discretion has
limits and was abused here. The court's ruling was part of a pattern of pretrial and trial rulings
that favored Plaintiffs and prejudiced Defendants. The mere presence at trial of the improper
punitive damage claim, which Defendants demonstrate elsewhere in their briefing was improper
on these facts, colored the jury's view of the entire case, and warrants a new trial.
5.

The Punitive Damage Award Here Violates Due Process.

Plaintiffs justify their $1.89 million remitted punitive damage award, and advocate
reinstatement of the jury's $6.21 million punitive award, based on two Idaho decisions and one
recent action by the U.S. Supreme Court. But none of those decisions cures the due process
problems with the punitive award here. Defendants review each of those cases in detail to
explain why Plaintiffs' reliance on them is unjustified.

-
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a.

Philfi~Morris Remand

The Supreme Court has said countless times that when it decides not to hear a case, that
decision does not reflect a decision on the merits that the underlying case was correctly decided.
See, e.g., Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 919 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.,
opinion regarding denial of certiorari) ("[Tlhis Court has rigorously insisted that such a denial
carries with it no implication whatever regarding the Court's views on the merits of a case which
it has declined to review."). Defendants already addressed the Phillip Morris remand in their
opening brief, explaining that Oregon Supreme Court held on remand, as a matter of state law,
that Phillip Morris was procedurally barred from challenging the punitive damage jury
instruction. See Appellants' Brief, p.39 n. 21. Thus, the Supreme Court's decision to dismiss
certiorari as improvidently granted cannot reasonably be viewed as support for the argument that
the Court completely changed course and now would permit a 97:l ratio of punitive to
compensatory damages despite clear and recent Supreme Court holdings to the contrary, see
Appellants ' Brief, pp. 36-40.
b.

Hall v. Farmers Alliance Mutual Insurance Co.

Plaintiffs avoid discussing the details of this Court's most recent punitive damage
decision in Hall v. Farmers Alliance Mutual Insurance Co., 145 Idaho 313, 179 P.3d 276 (2008).
They try to dismiss that case as involving "extremely different" facts, and insurer conduct that
was "very benign." Yet the proof of the insurer's alleged bad faith in Hall was far stronger than
what Plaintiffs present here. Hall involved extensive damage to a home in which the insurer
failed to cooperate in the claims appraisal process, delayed payment for repairs for 728 days,
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delayed sending a structural engineer to inspect the property, and apparently lied in connection
with the claims process. See 145 Idaho at 316-17, 179 P.3d at 279-80. Plaintiffs' argument that
these facts are "benign" compared to the instant case reflects fantasy rather than reality.
Nevertheless, even with these strong facts, this Court carefully reviewed recent U.S.
Supreme Court precedents and held that the ratio of 35:l for punitive to compensatory damages
is excessive and thus affirmed the trial court's reduction of that award to a 4:l ratio. See 145
Idaho at 321-24, 179 P.3d at 284-87.
In commenting on the insurance company's dilatory tactics, this Court concluded:
While it is true that insurance delay tactics may be highly inconsiderate and
perhaps even exploitive, they were not "particularly egregious" in this case. A
delay of approximately two years, the purported lies of Farmers, and the Halls'
other justifications for punitive damages may warrant a punitive result, but they
cannot be characterized as so particularly egregious that they justify an award
over eight times the ratio that "might be close to the line of constitutional
impropriety."
145 Idaho at 323, 179 P.3d at 286. On two of the due process guideposts (reasonable relationship
to harm likely to result and comparison to civil and criminal penalties for comparable conduct),
the Hall plaintiffs' support for a large punitive damage award was "nowhere close to being
sufficient to meet the constitutional due process requirements." Id.
Thus, Hall demonstrates that the punitive damage award here must be set aside or
reduced to an appropriate ratio like 1:l. Plaintiffs try to emphasize the third due process
guidepost of reprehensibility, Respondents' Brief; p. 35, but as Defendants have already
demonstrated elsewhere in their briefing, their conduct was not reprehensible.

-
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c.

Mvers v. Workmen's Auto Insurance Co.

Plaintiffs prefer to discuss and quote extensively Myers v. Workmen's Auto Insurance

Co., 140 Idaho 495,95 P.3d 977 (2004). See Respondents' Brief; p. 32-37. But that case predates
some of the important U.S. Supreme Court cases that this Court analyzed in Hall, as well as

Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S.Ct. 2605 (2008), and also involved the relatively unique
circumstances of an award of punitive damages on top of nominal compensatory damages. Given
this Court's ruling in Hall and recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions, Myers likely would be
decided differently today. A ratio of 408:l cannot be sustained under current due process case
law. Moreover, a ratio involving nominal damages is not meaningful in a case like this one
which involved a substantial compensatory damage award.
The U.S. Supreme Court's due process limitations on punitive damage awards have been
clear since at least 2003. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003),
emphatically strengthened the critical due process protection. See 538 U.S. at p.426 (explaining
that there is "no doubt that there is a presumption against an award that has a 145-to-1 ratio"); id.
at p.425 (observing that the traditional, legislatively authorized ratios of 1-to-1, 2-to-1, and 3401 are "instructive," if not "binding," for purposes of due process); id. (twice mentioning that, in
previous cases, it had suggested that a 4-to-1 ratio might be "close to the line of constitutional
impropriety"); id. (holding that "few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process"); id. at p.418
(concluding that its decision to strike down a 145-to-1 ratio was "neither close nor difficult").)
Indeed, Justice Ginsburg in her State Farm dissent noted "the numerical controls today's
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decision installs." Id. at 438. Thus, there is no question that State Farm effected a sea-change in
the law of punitive damages" by imposing more specific limits on the ratios that lower courts can
countenance.
In addition, Plaintiffs exaggerate when they label Defendants' conduct here "extreme."

Respondents' Brief; p. 35. Defendants' conduct should be viewed as cautious and reasonable, not
reprehensible (as this Court explained in Hall). Defendants did not "simply ignor[e]" Weinsteins,
but instead tried to work with them at every stage despite a lack of reciprocal cooperation. See

Appellants' Brief; p. 2-1 1.
As this Court's Hall decision recognized, Idaho courts do not have discretion to ignore
the federal constitutional dictates of the U.S. Supreme Court's Gore, Campbell, Philip Morris,
and Exxon Shipping decisions. The plain message of those decisions is that large excessive
punitive damage awards are not proper, and that the Court now sees a ratio of 1:l as the proper
ratio when punitive damages are warranted." Under those principles, the jury's original punitive
award of $6.21 million was plainly excessive at 28.5:1, and the remitted award of $1.89 million
at 9: 1 is still too high.
Plaintiffs skirt Defendants' other challenges to the punitive award here, including that the
court improperly allowed the jury to consider potential harm to others and evidence of harm to
persons in other states, refused to give proper and necessary jury instructions on punitive

Of course, any punitive award must still stem fiom proper factors rather than the prejudicial
factors Plaintiffs relied on here to incite the jury relying on the Defendants' total earnings and
alleged potential harm to others. See generally Appellants ' Brief; p. 29-41.
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damages, and allowed consideration of Defendants' net worth. See Appellants' BrieJ; p. 29-36.
Plaintiffs' silence on these arguments demonstrates they do not have a persuasive response.
Therefore, the Court should reverse the punitive damage award here, or substantially
reduce it to an amount of less than or equal to a 1: 1 ratio.
F.

ATTORNEY'S FEES WERE INAPPROPRIATE.
Plaintiffs' argument on this point is that "the Policy did not define, and Appellants did

not require, any specific form of proof of loss ...." Respondents' Brief, p. 38. This is not true.
Plaintiffs and their attorney were told on many occasions of the need for medical records to
support the claim for past medical expenses. It is also belied by Plaintiffs' own correspondence.
In his April 20, 2004, letter, Plaintiffs' counsel wrote: "Please consider this letter proof of loss
for medical expenses incurred on behalf of Sarah Weinstein through November 20, 2003." R.
392-405, Exhibit 10117 (PRU 651). (These records were incomplete, and Plaintiffs' counsel
supplement the records by a letter dated May 20, 2004). See R. 392-405, Exhibit 10118. In the
next paragraph, Plaintiffs' counsel indicated: "We will work over the next few weeks to get up to
date medical records and some sort of prognosis from the physician which could provide the
basis for a proof of loss as to future medical expenses." R. 392-405, Exhibit 10117 (PRU 651).
Thus, even Plaintiffs' counsel acknowledged that a proof of loss was not submitted until April
and May 2004, and that it was limited to a claim for past medical expenses.
Furthermore, no "proof of loss" was ever submitted as to future medical expenses or for
general damages. Plaintiffs never followed up on the promise in the April 20 and May 20, 2004
letters to provide a prognosis or up-to-date medical records. Plaintiffs never submitted a demand
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for a sum certain as required under extant case law. Associates Discount Corp. v. Yosemite Ins.

Co., 96 Idaho 249,257,526 P.2d 854 (1974); Carter v. Cascade Ins. Co., 92 Idaho 136, 138,438
P.2d 566 (1968).
In short, the trial court erred by awarding attorney's fees in contravention to the
requirements of Idaho Code 9 41-1839, Idaho case law, and the evidence.
G.

JUROR MISCONDUCT.
Plaintiffs' argument on this point is premised on an incorrect reading of McDonough

Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (1984). McDonough did not require
intentional dishonesty, but that the juror "failed to answer honestly a material question on voir

dire" and "that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause."
That has been established in this case.
The situation here very different from that in McDonough. In that case, the juror had
misinterpreted a question in voir dire asking about "injuries ... that resulted in any disability or
prolonged pain and suffering." One juror did not believe that the question extended to injuries
such as his son's broken leg, and another juror apparently omitted to mention a machinery
accident suffered by her husband. McDonough, 464 U.S. at 555. The evidence showed that the
jurors interpreted the question differently. Id. Moreover, there apparently was no reason to
suspect that the juror could have been dismissed for cause.
Similarly, in State v. Reutzel, 130 Idaho 88, 936 P.2d 1330 (Ct. App. 1997), where the
juror did not admit being acquainted with a defense witness, the relationship between the two
had been so slight and such a long time earlier that "[tlhe district court could properly find that
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this evidence did not show, clearly and convincingly, that Aultman gave a dishonest response, as
opposed to merely being mistaken or not recognizing Hawkins' name.. .." Id., 130 Idaho at 97.
In State v. Tolman, 121 Idaho 899, 828 P.2d 1304 (1992), the court apparently was
sat.isfied that the failure of the juror to admit that his wife had been molested was "dishonest,"
and immediately focused on whether the juror could have been dismissed for cause and decided
he could not have been. See Id., 121 Idaho at 902.
In Levinger v. Mercy Med. Ctr., 139 Idaho 192, 75 P.3d 1202 (2003), the issue was never
reached because it had not been properly preserved for appeal. See Id., 139 Idaho at 197-98.
In this case, the question directly related to having been insured by Defendants. There
was no ambiguity to the question that would permit to a mistake such as in McDonough.
Moreover, despite Mr. Barbo's claim that he didn't remember he was insured through Liberty,
the evidence was clear that not only had Mr. Barbo been denied coverage (which would have
been memorable in of itself) but Liberty's sales documents show that Mr. Barbo personally
contacted the Boise office numerous times with the last contact several months before the start of
the trial. Not only does this show a lack of credibility, but it demonstrates that there would have
been grounds to dismiss him for cause. Thus, the court erred by not granting a new trial because
of juror misconduct.
H.

THE ANNOTATED EXHIBIT LIST.
Plaintiffs' argument in this case are (i) that there was no objection at the time the lists

were distributed, and (ii) that the evidence was "proven." As to the first issue, the record is clear
that at the time the list was distributed, Plaintiffs' counsel did not inform either the Court or
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Defense counsel that he had included his own comments, and Defense counsel was involved
with discussing another matter with the judge and did not immediately pick up Plaintiffs'
counsel's sleight of hand. Certainly, when Defense counsel became aware of the annotations,
Defendants immediately presented an objection and moved for a new trial.
Second, the comments were not "proven" by Defendants' witnesses. Plaintiffs'
distribution of its attorney's comments on the case to the jurors is nothing less than jury
tampering. That the jury accepted Plaintiffs' story would be expected from this type of unfair
influence. Given the amount of time (i.e., days) that the jurors had to peruse the notes, a simple
instruction to return the sheets and disregard the contents was not sufficient. Thus, the trial court
erred by not granting a new trial.

I.

THE DAMAGES WERE EXCESSIVE AND UNSUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE.
The record is clear that none of the medical experts testified that, more probably than not

(or similar standard or certainty), that Sarah would acquire arthritis or require future surgery.
Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Shea, only indicated that Sarah had a higher risk for arthritis, and that
surgery was only one possible scenario. Dr. Weiss was the only one of the two doctors to attempt
to articulate the probability, and he indicated that Sarah's risk of arthritis or surgery was only 1%
more than the general population, which is a far cry from the 51% needed for a finding of more
probably than not, and does not indicate even a reasonable likelihood that a such arthritis or
surgery would be the result of her injuries. Thus, there was insufficient medical evidence to
support the damage award for Sarah.

-
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As discussed more fully above and in Appellant's opening brief, Mrs. Weinstein's
alleged emotional distress does not rise, as a matter of law, to the level necessary to support an
award of damages. Since this was the only extra-contractual damages alleged and for which
proof was offered, there is no basis for the award of damages to Mr. and Mrs. Weinstein.
As discussed above, the punitive damage award was unconstitutionally excessive and
unwarranted by the evidence. In addition, "[wlhen the base against which punitive damages is to
be measured is reversed for further proceedings, of necessity the award of punitive damages
likewise must be reversed for further proceedings." Yacht Club Sales and Service, Inc. v. First
Nat'l BankofN. Idaho, 101 Idaho 852,864,623 P.2d 464,476 (1980).

111. CONCLUSION.
Plaintiffs' claims are unsupported by facts or the law. Plaintiffs case is based on a novel
legal theory requiring advance partial payments on a UM claim. The punitive damages, even
under the remittitur, violate due process and were improperly awarded. The trial court erred by
not granting in Defendants'

favor summary judgment, directed verdict, judgment

notwithstanding the verdict, andlor a new trial.
DATED this

?f!day of August, 2009.
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP

BY ~*obert A. Anderson, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendants

'

-

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 44

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

P

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ?day
of August, 2009, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF by delivering the same to each of the
following attorneys of record, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows:
R. John Insinger
GOSS GUSTAVEL GOSS, PLLC
401 W. Front Street, Ste. 302
Boise, ID 83702

h
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

R. John Insinger
Jason S. Risch
RISCH PISCA, PLLC
407 W. Jefferson St.
Boise, ID 83702

[ I
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

]

obert A. Anderson

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 45

